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Zsolt Győri (1974) was born in Debrecen. This is where he earned his university
degree. His PhD dissertation (2007) focuses on Stanley Kubrick, analyzing the
"antihumanist" portrait of the director. At present he is lecturer at
the Department of English Studies of Esterházy Károly College in Eger. His
publications include articles in Hungarian journals as well as studies in
Hungarian and English anthologies. E-mail:
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Aldgate, Tony and Jeffrey Richards. (1986) Britain Can Take It: British Cinema
in the Second World War. Oxford:
Blackwell.
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Arendt, H. (1985) The Totalitarian Movement In
uő: The Origins of Totalitarianism. Orlando: Harcourt,
341-388.
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Bazin, A. (1997) The Myth of Stalin in the Soviet
Cinema. In uő: Major Essays and Reviews From the Forties and Fifties. London: Routeledge, 23-40.
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Dig for
Victory (1942, Ministry of Information and Ministry of Agriculture
Production)
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Hitler Assumes Command (1941, Movietone
News)
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Kracauer, S. (2004) Propaganda and the Nazi War Film. In uő: From Caligary to Hitler. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 275-306.
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More Eggs from Your Hens (1941, Ministry of Information for
Ministry of Agriculture Production)
The aim of this paper is to address the
interrelated fields of politics, nation and cinema in the period of the Second
World War, in short to reflect upon the uses and abuses of political cinema.
The study of British propaganda cinema is by no means a groundbreaking topic,
it has been discussed to varying degrees and depths by several monographs, most
notably Britain Can Take It by Tony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards. The Cinema and
Society series (I.B Tauris Press) edited by Richards has revealed a treasure-chest
of essential material on the topic, but has yet failed to come up with a volume
that examines theoretical issues and offers a theoretical framework that would
contextualize the archival material compiled by the film historian and
historian. The following sections are to be read as notes towards such a line
on inquiry.
The aim of this paper is to address the
interrelated fields of politics, nation and cinema in the period of the Second
World War, in short to reflect upon the uses and abuses of political cinema. The
study of British propaganda cinema is by no means a groundbreaking topic, it has
been discussed to varying degrees and depths by several monographs, most
notably Britain Can Take It by Tony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards. The Cinema and Society
series (I.B Tauris Press) edited by Richards has revealed a treasure-chest of
essential material on the topic, but has yet failed to come up with a volume
that examines theoretical issues and offers a theoretical framework that would contextualize
the archival material compiled by the film historian and historian. The
following sections are to be read as notes towards such a line on inquiry. I
must state at the very beginning that I am rather interested in the underlying
mental structures and logic of propaganda than in the systematic overview of material
associated with details of production and reception. The real predecessor of
the type of research I wish to undertake here is Siegfried Kracauer, who in his
From Caligari to Hitler sets up a
truly interdisciplinary theoretical framework that is capable of analysing the
complex - sociological, political and aesthetic - forces at work in the period
studied. An other essential source for such research would have to be Hannah
Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism,
especially chapter eleven entitled "The Totalitarian Movement" in which she
describes the logic underlying ideological indoctrination. Her accounts on the
organization of a classless, uprooted and de-individualised mob which is no
longer capable of creating consensus regarding the priorities of survival for
the group and likewise cannot distinguish between real and fictitious ambitions
are well applicable to the field of cinema and the study of propaganda films
(both newsreels and feature films).
In fact, to determine the full scope of my comparative
reading into the nature of propaganda I could have continued the titles as
follows: "Churchill as film critic and Hitler as filmmaker". These figureheads
of mid-20th century European historical scene embody distinct ways
of politicising art, using a complex institutional apparatus to influence,
persuade and organise masses. The vocabularies Churchill and the totalitarians (Stalin,
Goebbels or Hitler) imposed on cinema signify different degrees of intervention
into public life, in other words the framework of empowering the public -
despite its surface similarities - are different. Instead of emphasizing characteristics
inherent to various propaganda practices I outline a divergent history of
public persuasion and political cinema. Consequently I will, on the one hand, use
the term indoctrination to describe
the ideologically formulated propaganda in totalitarian regimes and, on the
other hand, use the term invisible conformity
to refer to the propaganda of so called liberal democracies such as Britain where
ideology is probably less obtrusive. According to a historical reading wartime
propaganda in the totalitarian block to a large extent inherited the principles
and practices of agitprop introduced in the Soviet Union at the end of the 20s
(possibly in 1929 as far as cinema is concerned) and in Germany after the Nazis
rose to power in 1933, so well before the outbreak of the Second World War. In Britain, on the
other hand, there were no pre-war developments of this kind, the policy of
appeasement heralded by Neville Chamberlain had no interest in political
propaganda of any sort. The socially conscious cinema of the GPO Film Unit and the
documentary movement spearheaded by John Grierson is an important stylistic and
thematic precursor to propaganda films (both shorts and features), however, I
will not discuss them in detail. I could say that the comparative reading I
undertake is less a historical than a geographical-structural one. More
important for me is analysing the differences in the logic of cinematic propaganda,
the dissimilarities between organizing masses through ideological
indoctrination on the one hand and invisible conformity on the other.
Cinema came into full possession of its power
in the period when different political dictators and assemblages of
totalitarian practices rose to dominate European history. The technical
maturation of cinema took place parallel with the coming into age of strategies
and techniques of organizing and controlling masses, that is, a new and lively
representation of reality in a factually precise manner occurred simultaneously
with the barbaric counterfeiting of the world, the debasement of reality. This
was a period when figures like Stalin, Hitler and Goebbels proclaimed
themselves self-made filmmakers, and through agitation, censorship and
liquidation they silenced trained cinema personnel or, for the worst, brought
them in possession of their fascist or communist instincts. What these
dictators saw as the necessary transformation of cinema to become a vehicle of ideological
indoctrination was possibly the strangling of the natural development of
cinematic form. They could not care less, their aim was not to advance, but
exploit film art. For a moment it seemed as if cinema became a tool of
manipulation in the hands of the despot in a more powerful manner than a
vehicle of democratic values. One aim of my research is to argue against this
assumption.
A certain paradox characterises cinema being
used as an instrument of propaganda, especially ideological indoctrination. Exploiting
cinema's ability to represent everyday life in an authentic manner, to become a
mirror of reality which the spectators accept without criticism, totalitarian cinema
forges realism and empowers the myths, lies and fictions. The mode of address
characterising indoctrination uses the cinematic image in order (1) to
intensify ideological loyalty by celebrating the collective powers of a
community, (2) to concentrate on heroic existence and (3) to
historicise the present. These characteristics underline the instructive tone and
authoritative mode of address. Ideological loyalty is achieved by making everyone
understand the basic necessity to develop the new consciousness of the
fascist/communist man, an identity formed to show total obedience to party
principles. An authoritative tone is always intrusive. As practised by
totalitarian institutes it annuls the private sphere of the individual, and
introduces an artificially constructed, false self-image: that of the heroic superman.
Social/real identity is replaced by a myth. As André Bazin points out in his
essay entitled "The Myth of Stalin in the Soviet Cinema" the source of the authoritative tone
appeared in Soviet cinema at the same time when realism gave over to a mythic
view of the world and the leaders of the country. According to Bazin under Stalin
the cinematographic image rose to a transcendental, godlike position: inscribed
in it was historical materialism in person. As the leaders rose to the position of
idols, their beliefs lost all personal traits and became transcendental dogma.
In a Foucauldian manner we could say that the mythic knowledge possessed and
articulated about the world by the dictator becomes the only framework through
which earthly matters can be addressed. Since this archive of knowledge - which,
by the way, determines what can be said and seen, thought and remembered - is
the essence of history, reality must be shaped accordingly. As idolatry and
continuous forgery is converted into "new realism", existence itself receives a
fairy-tale quality, people no longer believe their own eyes and ears, and
consequently alienation takes one step further. As Arendt argues, they are dazzled by
their own historical importance and made totally dependent on a distant future,
that should one day see the rise of an Empire based either on birth/race (Germany) or on
class (Soviet Union).
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The logic of ideological propaganda - as
described by film theoretician Sigfried Kracauer - took a very similar shape in
Nazi Germany. Written about the propaganda of the early war years "Propaganda
and the Nazi War Film" studies the dynamic frame as a central stylistic pattern
of Nazi cinema. In a general sense we can say that the mobile frame is a method associated with
realism, yet Kracauer makes it clear that in Germany it came to achieve just
the opposite. The speed of editing - argues Kracauer - makes intellectual
understanding and contextual interpretation impossible. What remains are vague
and mythic impressions, an image with all surface and no depth. With the
intellectual layer eliminated the visual saturation of the image (through swift
editing and the use of the moving camera) accompanied by the non-informative
voice-over commentaries create the illusion of an unstoppable and robust force
on the screen. With the monumentalism of the image completed, every
trifle will be portrayed as having a historical gravity. Kracauer notes that in
case this dynamism of Nazi cinema had halted for a single second, the intellectual
emptiness of the image would have revealed and the whole system collapsed. What
he means is that to demystify the cinema of illusions one has to look behind
the surface, crack the image open. Possibly the greatest challenge of cinematic
indoctrination is not the transformation of myth into reality through the
involvement of a phoney historical transcendence, but to keep the image from
cracking up. To do this one really needs to be a superman (Übermensch).
Hitler Assumes Command
A 1941 British short film entitled Hitler Assumes Command debunks the
superman in a grand manner. It borrows archive footage of marches from Nazi
party-films and via motion manipulation and the inclusion of humorous popular
music (played in a music-hall and later used in animation movies) it gives rise
to satire. The comic effects are deadly serious, they reveal that the
transcendental image of the historic greatness is nothing but a constructed
image, an artificial reality. The banality of the music elegantly wastes the
almost religious trance of the original material. The filmmaker cracks the
image up by undermining the sanctity of mobility and dynamism, which can no
longer be identified as an allegorical representation of the glorious Third
Reich. The true meaning of repetition is also uncovered and is identified as a
form of spoon-feeding, of utter schematism. As the subvertive tone annuls the underlying
principles of indoctrination, the spectator snaps out of the hypnotic trance and
regains the possibility of an intellectually independent comprehension. Hitler Assumes Command is a critique of
(1) Hitler, the person, his maniac gestures and pompous grimaces, (2) Hitlerism
and the ceremonious tone and imagery of national socialism and (3) and the
distortive-vicious ideology underlying ideological indoctrination.
The emptiness I analysed above as the main
component of totalitarian indoctrination is first and foremost a communicative one.
In order to analyse it I need to turn over to the western practices of
propaganda and its distinct differences from ideological indoctrination.
The use of cinema in the organization and
strengthening of masses in Britain
was not accompanied by the establishment of an alternative reality which people
were subdued to and forced to recognize as authentic against their own better
judgement. British wartime cinema did not differ much from its totalitarian
equal as far as schematism was concerned, yet it did not possess, on the
contrary opposed the three-fold nature of the image outlined above. Although
very few British productions failed to value the national unity based on the
collectivist idea, individualism and the freedom of opinion was never suppressed
as something utterly redundant and rotten.
British propaganda was characterised by the dismissal
of antirational and mythic thinking and the celebration of individual values. The
presence of these values prevented the emergence of personality cult symptomatic
of totalitarian regimes. Churchill was not a cinema star, his image was shaped
by radio broadcasts, a cool and therefore less efficient medium of propaganda. Nevertheless
his extraordinary oratorical skills gave strong competition to the vast
resources of the ministry of propaganda in Berlin. I do not mean to suggest that
Churchill never distorted facts, restrained himself from the vulgar and
oversimplistic "us-them" type of rhetoric, or altogether condemned the
authoritative and emotionally saturated tone. Surely both him and the political
ideology (that of the so called liberal democracy) he helped to maintain is
based on strong demagogism, but in an entirely different way and to a
completely different degree compared totalitarian societies. Being one of the
first politicians to realise the importance of mass communication, he surely
understood the power of propaganda. He also understood that given the right
impetus people will organize themselves and embrace the idea of patriotism more
effectively than by party-led and state-authorized terror. The term invisible conformity
alludes to conformity achieved by people who besides sharing the utilitarian
idea, deny inhumane social practices. The kind of conformity I am talking about
is not a received uniformity, but an actively produced one. It is invisible
because it follows from a tactful ideology which is fully absorbed by everyday
life by people living in the present. The idea of self-organisation can be a
democratic principle because it describes an activity of people who have not
lost touch with everyday reality. It consequently opposes the monumental
ideologies designed for heroic supermen living for the future. I define it as
an activity of people who can value unheroic existence, accept living in the
shadow of history, and establish national unity in order to fight a war that
will leave everyone involved in total despair.
More Eggs From Your Hens
I mean various things by the "right impetus",
first and foremost humour. In the 1941 newsreel More Eggs from Your Hens we see a very simple message - save kitchen scraps for more
eggs - expanded into a narrative of a self-aware and assertive chicken asking
questions at higher and higher offices about the low rations. Animal existence
defined in human terms is itself a source of amusement, yet the image of a
chicken "scaling the ranks" with her enquiry, being called My Dear by the
farmer, Madam by the corn merchant and finally Mrs White by the Minister of
Agriculture is openly comic, yet in its representation of bureaucratic
administration of affairs is also lifelike. Beside its light-hearted tone the
film also touches upon serious matters. It portrays Britain as a place where anyone can
ask questions, even unpleasant ones (since the authorities themselves are
addressing these problems) and hopefully the community will be able to answer
them. In this country the straightforward little chicken will not be regarded
as a saboteur, a kulak, but the living conscience of the group that enquires,
argues and generates solutions. In short her journey will be recognized as the
triumph of the spirit of political activism (as opposed to ideological activism).
Likewise important is the question of
informativeness in British propaganda. In this regard we can identify yet
another crucial difference between ideological indoctrination and invisible
conformity. The former values fiction over fact, the latter relegates the
process of information to facts. Even the hard-line propaganda pieces financed
by the Ministry of Information can be praised for their informativeness, and
their aim to offer practical information to people who have lost their
accustomed points of reference. Information linked the gap between the old and
the new and had the positive
message that people could survive this war without having to significantly alter
their basic beliefs. More importantly it suggests that peace could be achieved
through the sacrifice of people, but not through the total alienation from their
customary lives.
Dig For Victory
A good example is the film Dig for
Victory, a kind of illustrated manual on how to grow fruit and vegetables
around the house. The underlying message is that Britain
- known to be a nation of gardeners - does not have to give up, just alter its
love of nature and use the land in a more rational way. In fact most propaganda
shorts focus on practical information - like advice on how to ride a bicycle
during black-out, how to evacuate children in danger and how to use the scarce
food and cloths resources. Parallel to this they extracted the image of
Britishness from the deep concern of people towards everyday life. These details
are of enormous importance. On the one hand they certify that the whole system
of communication (and also propaganda) relied on public involvement. Real
social communication occurs only when everyday life generates the topics
addressed by propaganda. One cornerstone of such a system is the equality of access
to information, an essential democratic principle. The democratization of
information using all the chanells of mass media was probably one of the most
important developments of the wartime years and a real catalist to future
establishment of an equalitarian welfare society.
Still, the greatest achievement was understanding the real importance of giving
attention to the everyday, ordinary and trivial existence and not repeating the
mistake of the Weimar
Republic. Then the dissillusionment
and anguish of the people lead to their embracing political extremism. Political
art did neither offer assistance to the people nor did it strengthen their
belief in a community addressing problems in a rational way. With the rise of
fascism a form of mass comunication came into being that never intended to eliminate
despair. On the contrary they used it to make people totally disinterested in
the real present. For the Nazi leaders the present was an obstacle to reaching
the glorious future. Unlike
in the cinema of indoctrination, which offers a blueprint for action that bares
a fruit in the distant future, liberal propaganda wants people to survive and
themselves shape the future. The sharp distinction between men who were born
for victory (totalitarian man) and the men who are born after defeats
(democratic subject) is made evident by the difference of the former's
affection towards heroic existence in the mythic future and the latter's
preference for a non-heroic survival in the present. The alternate mental compositions
are well reflected in the sharp contrast between being informed and being
swallowed up by quasi transcendental rituals and ceremonies: those who regard
information valuable are programmed to self-care, whereas those who are
programmed for deceptive ceremonies, self-deprivation and self-sacrifice are
the chief values.
The last and possibly most important difference
between democratic propaganda and ideological indoctrination is the conflict of
history and politics. Whereas totalitarian dictators never cease to emphasize
that history is on their side, politics is never devalued and ceases to loose
legitimacy in liberal democracies. In fact I believe that the democratic institutions of politics including
the public contest between interest groups of different aims and behaviour were
altogether lacking in totalitarian regimes. In the latter the public was not
fighting for anything, the ideological elite fought in the name of the people, unlike
in countries where basic human rights were not fully ignored. In totalitarian
regimes political battles did not clash interests through public debates: in
declaring public involvement in debates as something degenerate, or empty
theatricality, such regimes altogether repressed the social demand for open
discussion. Ideological indoctrination in general eliminates all these
elements, and although the party elite argues that all aspects are life are
politicised, that people are fighting a permanent revolution, this is empty
rhetoric. In reality people are robbed of the common sense to form alliances of
different interests and debate towards a consensus. Political consciousness is
simply lacking in these countries.
Britain underwent major social changes
during the Second World War, it was practically transformed from a class
society to a nation thirsty for radical political reforms on all areas of life.
Propaganda served as catalyst in this process, the image of a nation unified
under pressure left such a strong mark on popular memory that the idea of
collectivism shaped pos- war political developments. Wartime films prepared
grounds for the transformation in a sense that they foregrounded the idea of
collectivism in the sense that the formation of national unity weakens the
traditional boundaries of class and gender. Turning the concept of self-care
into a national project was part of the scheme.
So what kind of a "film critic" was Churchill?
How were the wartime strategies to mobilize Britain both in body and spirit put
through by the political elite? Additionally: how could cinema be involved in
creating patriotism and strengthening group identity? The genuine insight,
surely not invented, but actively practiced by the government and Churchill
himself is that in order to resist Nazi expansion militarily one has to resist
the rhetoric and mentality that drives this expansion forward.
In my presentation I tried to outline the main
components of resistance. Resistance clearly took many forms, sometimes it took
the shape of open criticism, like in my example of Hitler Assumes Command, a caricature of the whole context of
personality cult. On another level the informative emptiness of the
totalitarian image is a critique of cinema as a certain kind of mass
communication.
I intended to talk about yet another form of
resistance and this is the level I am really interested in. This is cinema as
an allegory of the nation, Britishness. This is resistance at the level of
politics (and the beliefs, values and principles it relies on) and a critique
of the ideology of indoctrination. This is the level on which structural
differences are manifested between totalitarianism and liberalism. Right after
the Second World War history made these differences apparent. In June 1945 the
unimaginable happened, Churchill lost the general elections. His defeat at the
polls is yet one of his greatest victories. Why? Rather than answering that
question I have one to ask from you. Could similar events have ever taken place
in Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia? The answer to that question makes all the
difference.
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